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The influence of the Solicitor General upon
Supreme Court disposition of federal
circuit court decisions: a closer look at the
Ninth Circuit record
by Gerald F. Uelmen
Table 1

Record of Solicitor General, 1963-1982

Petitions for certiorari by Solicitor General

Filed
29

36
30

Granted
16
29
21

30

25

38

24
22
19
31
27
36
39
47
38
37
33

27
37
45

39
52
61
66
50

48
57

52
55
50
57

66
925

37
43
31

45
39
639

Per cent
granted
55
81
70
83

63
81
51
69
69

69
64
71

76
77
58
71
78
62
79
59

69.1

Per cent of all
petitions for
certiorari granted

Per cent of cases
decided in favor of
government's position*

9
7
7
7
10
7
5
6
9

69
75
61
75
63
64
58
67
70
71
75
70
77
60
63
67
66
72
82

6
6
5
7
6
5
6
6
6
5
4
6.45

67
68.6

*The tabulation of "cases decided in favor of government's position" includes all cases in which the Solicitor General
participated whether on certiorari or appeal, and whether as counsel for the government or as amicus on behalf of another
party.
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Annual Report 1973, 1978, 1983.

1. Spaeth, Supreme Court disposition of federal
circuit court decisions, 68 JuDICATURE 245 (1985).
2. Id. at 250. Spaeth explains the significantly
higher reversal rate of the D.C. Circuit in terms of
three factors: "the large number of cases to which
the United States is a party, the court's special relationship with the Solicitor General, and an acceptance rate of cert petitions more than double the rate
of the next highest circuit." Id. at 249.
The possible explanations for the D.C. Circuit's
higher Supreme Court reversal rate are explored in
Note, Disagreement in D.C.: The relationship
Between the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit
and Its Implications for a National Court of
Appeals, 59 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1048 (1984). The authors
attribute it to ideological incompatibility of the
D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court. In considering the role of the Solicitor General, they reject the
suggestion that the behavior of the Solicitor may be
an independent cause of the D.C. Circuit's high
reversal rate in part because the circuit's affirmance
rate in cases in which the Solicitor General sought
reversal was higherthan in cases in which the Solicitor General did not participate during the 1980,

1981, 1982 and 1983 Terms. Idat 1063. That pattern
continued in the 1984 Term. Compare Tables 4 and
5. In the Ninth Circuit, the rate of affirmance in
cases in which the Solicitor General sought reversal
was substantially lower than the cases in which he
did not participate in both the 1983 and 1984 Terms.
Compare Table 4 (overall affirmance rate of 6.9 per
cent and 22.6 per cent) with Table 5 (overall affirmance rate of zero).
3. Spaeth, supra n. 1, at 249. Spaeth identified
the Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits as dominated by
Carter appointees, yet found in the three terms ending in 1982 that they were upheld at close to or
above their overall level. The Ninth Circuit, he
reported, "was upheld at a 39 per cent rate-3
points above its overall level." Id at 249. Spaeth also
notes that the proportions of decisions upheld or
overturned within any given circuit display considerable variation from one term to another, offering
several examples of this phenomenon. Id at 250.
4. Table I permits a comparison of the 1983-85
data reported in this article with the Solicitor General's record for the previous 20 years.
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presented the results of a survey of
the first 14 terms of the Burger
n
January
1985, Harold
J. Spaeth
that
concluding
(1969-1982),
Court
the Court does not differ in the treatment
of federal circuit court decisions depending on which circuit they emanate from.t
His analysis included two significant
findings:
e With the exception of the D.C. Circuit, federal circuit court decisions are
treated as an undifferentiated mass from
2
which the Justices select cases for review.
e Circuits dominated by appointees of
President Carter fare no better or worse
than those not so dominated."
I believe both of these conclusions are
premature. The record of the most recent
two terms of the Burger Court convincingly demonstrates the overwhelming impact of a factor which Professor Spaeth's
data did not take into account: the influence of the office of the Solicitor General
(see Table 1),' and the data gives rise to a
strong inference that that influence was
used to "target" the circuit most dominated by Carter appointees for special
attention: the Ninth. The Ninth Circuit
is the largest of the federal circuits, including the far western states of Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon and Washington.

The Solicitor General's record
The overall record compiled by the office
of the Solicitor General in recent years
can only be described as phenomenal. In
fiscal 1984, 2,861 certioraripetitions were
filed seeking review of opinions of the

Table 2 Certiorari petitions from decisions by U.S. Courts of Appeals, fiscal year 1984

Circuit
1st

The disproportionate
number of cases
emanating from the
Ninth Circuit is
immediately apparent.

2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
D.C.
Totals

Total cases
disposed of
by U.S. Courts
of Appeals

Certiorari
petitions
filed

Per cent of
decisions in
which petitions
filed

Petitions
granted

493
1,224
1,360
884
1,702
1,499
1,204
875
2,051
909
1,596
530
14,327

117
260
271
242
285
315
238
174
443
124
306
86
2,861

23.7
21.2
19.9
27.4
16.7
21.0
19.8
19.9
21.6
13.6
19.2
16.2
20.0

12
24
19
8
6
21
7
6
46
5
15
17
186

Per cent
granted
10.3
9.2
7.0
3.3
2.1
6.7
2.9
3.4
10.4
4.0
4.9
19.8
6.5

Source: 1984 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

Table 3 Certiorari petitions from decisions by U.S. Courts of Appeals filed by Solicitor
General, 1983-84 and 1984-85 Terms
Petitions filed by
Solicitor General
1983-84 1984-85

Circuit
1st

U.S. Courts of Appeals. Only 186, or 6.5
per cent were granted (see Table 2).5 During the 1983-84 Term, the Solicitor General filed 49 petitions seeking review of
opinions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals;
42 were granted, or 85.7 per cent. The
1984-85 Term approximated this record,
with 33 out of 43, or 76.7 per cent of the
Solicitor's petitions from court of appeals
decisions being granted (see Table 3).
Once a petition is granted, the Solicitor General also enjoys a greater rate of
success in the outcome of the case than
other litigants. The reversal rate for all
courts of appeals decisions reviewed by
the Supreme Court during the 1983-84
Term was 69.2 per cent. The rate for the
1984-85 Term was 61.9 per cent (see Table
4). Of the 37 courts of appeals decisions
heard on the petition of the Solicitor General during the 1983-84 Term, 32 were
reversed or vacated and 5 were affirmed
(see Table 5).6 The Solicitor General succeeded in 86.5 per cent of his cases! While
the overall reversal rate dropped 7.3 per
cent during the 1984-85 Term, the Solicitor General's success rate for the most
recent term went up: of the 25 cases reviewed on petition by the Solicitor, 22.5
were vacated or reversed, and 2.5 were
affirmed (see Table 5).7 The Solicitor succeeded in 90 per cent of his cases. Commenting on the Solicitor's recent success,
one court watcher concluded,
It is hazardous to try to generalize these
patterns into a conclusion about the direction of the Court. For now, however, a pru362 Judicature Volume 69, Number 6

2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
D.C.
Totals

Petitions granted
1983-84
1984-85

Per cent granted
1983-84 1984-85

1

0

1

0

100.0

1
4
2
3
3
2
2
17
3
3
8
49

1
5
4
2
6
2
3
11
0
2
7
43

1
4
2
2
3
2
1
14
3
2
7
42

1
5
4
1
4
1
2
10
0
2
3
33

100.0
100.0
100.0
66.7
100.0
100.0
50.0
82.4
100.0
66.7
87.5
85.7

100.0
100.0
100.0
50.0
66.7
50.0
66.7
90.9
100.0
42.9
76.7

Compiled from Supreme Court Proceedings reported in United States Law Week, Volume 52 (1983-84) and Volume 53
(1984-85).

dent lawyer would be reluctant to bet
against the federal government in the Supreme Court. s
The purpose of this article is not to
marvel at the remarkable success rate of
the Solicitor General, but to inquire
whether the power that this success generates is utilized to manipulate the docket
of the Supreme Court. The Solicitor
General's recent success should be analyzed in terms of whether he treats federal circuit decisions as an "undifferentiated mass" from which cases are selected for review, and whether circuits
dominated by Carter appointees fare better or worse in his process of selection.
5. Direct appeals from decisions of the U.S.
Courts of Appeals have not been included in the
tables or analysis presented in this article. As noted
by the Federal Judicial Center, REPORT OF THE
STUDY GROUP ON THE CASE LOAD OF THE SUPREME

COURT (1972) at p. 34: "More than 99 per cent of all

courts of appeals decisions are now reviewed in the
Supreme Court only by certiorari." The Study
Group recommended that the tiny fraction of cases
in which a statutory right of appeal remained be
brought within the certiorari jurisdiction.
6. The figures in Table 5 do not coincide with
the figures in Table 3, since the cases in which
certiorari petitions were ruled on in the 1983-84
Term were not necessarily decided during that
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Since the Solicitor General dominates
from 20-30 per cent of the Court's federal
docket, the answers to these inquiries
will ultimately affect the validity of any
conclusions whether the Court differs in
the treatment of federal circuit court
decisions depending on which circuit
they emanate from.

The Ninth Circuit record
When the total number of certioraripetitions granted is compared to the number
of petitions filed, the variations from
circuit to circuit appear negligible. While
the highest rates of petitions granted
appear in the D.C., Ninth, First and
Term, and the decisions would include some cases
in which certiorari was granted during the previous
Term. In addition, the figures in Table 3 include
cases in which the Court granted review and simultaneously vacated thejudgment below for reconsideration in light of an intervening precedent. See
Hellman, Granted, Vacated, and Remanded-Shedding Light on a Dark Corner of Supreme Court
Practice, 67 JUDICATURE 389 (1984). The figures in
Trables 4 and 5 include all cases in which formal
opinions were issued, whether after oral argument
or by summary reversal.
7. See n. 6, supra.
8. Stewart, A Fast Start for the Federal Government, A.B.A.J. 108, 113 (March, 1985).

Table 4 Outcome of decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals reviewed by the Supreme Court,
1983-84 and 1984-85 Terms.
Circuit
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
D.C.
Totals

Number upheld
1983-84 1984-85
2.0
5.0
5.5
4.5
3.5
4.0
4.5
2.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
1.0
37.0

2.5
6.0
3.5
3.0
0.5
7.0
4.0
2.0
7.0
3.0
6.0
0.5
45.0

Total reviewed
1983-84
1984-85
7
9
13
8
8
8
6
10
29
6
7
9
120

Per cent upheld
1983-84 1984-85

5
11
9
7
3
15
10
6
31
6
10
5
118

28.6
55.6
42.3
56.3
43.8
50.0
75.0
20.0
6.9
16.7
28.6
11.1
30.8

50.0
54.5
38.9
42.9
16.7
46.7
40.0
33.3
22.6
50.0
60.0
10.0
38.1

Compiled from the official reports of U.S. Supreme Court opinions for the 1983-84 and 1984-85 Terms, utilizing the same
procedure described by Spaeth, "Supreme court disposition of federal circuit court decisions," 68 Judicature 246-47 (1985).
Docket numbers rather than case citations are counted, so "consolidated" cases are separately counted. Bifurcated dispositions affirming in part and reversing in part are treated as half upheld and half overturned.

Table 5
Circuit
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
D.C.
Totals

Outcome of decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals reviewed on petition by Solicitor
General, 1983-84 and 1984-85 Terms
Number upheld
Total reviewed
Per cent upheld
1983-84 1984-85
1983-84
1984-85
1983-84
1984-85
0

0

1

0

0.0

0.5
1.5
0
0
1.0
1.0
0
0
0
0
1.0
5.0

0
1.0
1.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.5
2.5

3
5
1
0
2
1
2
15
2
1
4
37

0
2
2
1
2
1
2
12
1
0
2
25

16.7
30.0
0
50.0
100.0
0
0
0
0
25.0
13.5

50.0
50.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
25.0
10.0

Compiled from the official reports of U.S. Supreme Court opinions for the 1983-84 and 1984-85 Terms.

Second Circuits (see Table 2), the overall
data hardly supports an inference that
any circuit is being "targeted" for special treatment.
When the number of petitions filed by
the Solicitor General is broken down by
circuit, however, the disproportionate
number of cases emanating from the
Ninth Circuit is immediately apparent.
Although the Ninth is the busiest of the
12 circuits, it still only handles 14 per
cent of the total caseload disposed of by
9. See, e.g., Overend, 9th Circuit is '0 for 22' in
High CourtReviews, Los ANGELES TimEs, June 25,
1984, at p. 1; Carrizosa, High Court Term Brings27
Reversals for Ninth Circuit, Los ANGELES DAtLY
JOURNAL, July 13, 1984, at p.1; Bartlett, A Rare
Victory for Court in S.F., SAN FRANCtSCO CHRONI CLE, June 27, 1984, at p. 12; Baker, Activists on the
Ninth Circuit Strike Out, WALL STREET JOURNAL,
September 25, 1984, at p.28; Maher, 'Engine, Engine
Number 9... ,'CALIFORNIA LAWYER, February, 1985,
at p. 39.
10. Remarks of Rex E. Lee, Solicitor General,
delivered at Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference,
Seattle, Washington, August 16, 1984, at p. 4.
11. Florida v. Meyers, - U.S. - 80 L.Ed.2d 381,
104 S.Ct. 1852 (1984).
12. Id. at 80 L.Ed.2d at 386, 104 S.Ct. at 1855.
Compare Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. - - 105
S.Ct. 308,83 L.Ed.2d 165,171-75 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
13. Id. at - n. 3,80 L.Ed.2d at 387, n. 3,104 S.Ct.
at 1855, n. 3.

all U.S. Courts of Appeals each year (see
Table 2). In the 1983-84 Term, however,
34.7 per cent of the petitions filed by the
Solicitor General from all 12 circuits
were in Ninth Circuit cases, a total of 17
out of 49. That pattern is repeated in the
1984-85 Term, with 11 out of 43, or 25.6
per cent of the Solicitor General's petitions being filed in Ninth Circuit cases
-24 of the 28 were granted, or 86 per
cent (see Table 3).
The Solicitor's high rate of success is
disproportionately reflected in the reversal rate of the Ninth Circuit which
attracted so much attention after the
1983-84 Term. 9 While the Ninth Circuit
was reversed in 27 out of 29 cases, over
half of the reversals came in cases in
which the Solicitor General petitioned
for certiorari.The Ninth Circuit reversal
rate dropped to 24 out of 31 in the 198485 Term, but again, 50 per cent of the
reversals were in cases brought by the
Solicitor General (see Tables 4 and 5).

Error correction
Several explanations might be offered
for the disproportionate attention the
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Ninth Circuit is receiving from the Solic-

itor General. Most obvious is the suggestion that the Ninth Circuit hands down
more erroneous decisions which require
correction than emanate from other circuits. It might be argued that this explanation misconceives the role of the Supreme Court, however. The use of
Supreme Court hearings merely to correct the errors of lower courts would
involve the squandering of a scarce resource. The Solicitor authorizes only
one out of every six requests to file certioraripetitions which he receives.' 0 Presumably, every request involves a palpable claim of error. Cases should be selected on the basis of their broad-scale
impact on the administration of justice.
If the Solicitor perceived his role as correcting the errors of lower courts, he
could certainly find dozens of cases to
take up from each of the federal circuits
every year.
There is certainly a plausible basis to
suggest that the Burger Court itself is
assuming a greater role of error correction. At least in criminal cases, the Court
is resorting to the vehicle of summary
reversal in more and more cases every
term. During the 1983-84 Term, Justice
Stevens wrote an unusual dissent to one
of these reversals,tt pointing out that
this practice posed "disturbing questions concerning the Court's conception
of its role."
Each such case, considered individually,
may be regarded it [sic] as a welcome step
forward in the never ending war against

crime. Such decisions are certain to receive
widespread approbation, particularly by
members of society who have been victim-

ized by lawless conduct. But we must not
forget that a central purpose of our written
Constitution, and more specifically of its
unique creation of a life tenured federal
judiciary, was to ensure that certain rights
are firmly secured against possible oppres-

sion by the federal or state governments....
Yet the Court's recent history indicates that,
at least with respect to its summary dispositions, it has been primarily concerned with

vindicating the will of the majority and less
interested in its role as a protector of the
individual's constitutional rights.1i

Justice Stevens cited 19 examples of
summary dispositions in the previous
three terms, all decided on the petition of

the warden or prosecutor, and all successful "in obtaining reversal of a decision upholding a claim of constitutional
right."'t" During the 1984-85 Term, Jus-

Table 6 Per cent of appeals reversed by
U.S. Courts of Appeals after hearing
or submission
Circuit
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
D.C.
All circuits

All cases
1984
1983
18.6
13.7
13.8
20.8
17.5
15.7
15.8
14.7
16.9
11.5
17.5
12.1
15.9

20.6
16.4
13.0
22.2
18.9
17.4
12.4
16.5
16.5
16.3
13.0
15.9
16.3

Table 7 Per cent of criminal appeals
reversed: Ninth Circuit vs. all
circuits

Criminal cases
1983
17.9
8.2
10.7
10.6
8.2
10.5
5.5
7.6
12.2
13.4
5.6
4.1
9.4

1984
7.8
9.5
6.4
6.6
12.4
11.7
3.7
8.3
15.6
11.0
7.0
2.9
9.7

Compiled from the Annual Reports of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1983 and 1984,
Table B-1.

tice Brennan returned to this theme, noting that eight more cases had been added
to Justice Stevens' list during the current
term, and concluding, "Because I find
this one-sided practice of summary error
correction inappropriate, I would vote
merely to deny this petition for certiorari."14
An analysis of the origin of the 27
cases summarily reversed during the past
four terms reveals a significant pattern20 of the 27 emanated from the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, of which eight, or 40
per cent, were Ninth Circuit cases. Four
of the cases were before the Court on a
petition for certiorarifiled by the Solicitor General, the only four which involved direct appeals from a judgment of
conviction. The other cases all involved
federal habeas corpus proceedings, in
which the petitions for certiorariwere
filed by state authorities. Curiously, all
four of the summarily reversed cases
brought to the Court by the Solicitor
emanated from the Ninth Circuit.
Since the Burger Court is willing to
devote more of its docket to the process of
error correction in criminal cases, the
Solicitor General appears to be selecting
some cases for review on that basis. But it
seems remarkable that such a disproportionate share of the cases deserving of
such attention would be found in one
federal circuit.
The suggestion that the Ninth Circuit
hands down more erroneous decisions
which need correction than do other circuits also appears implausible. A decision can only be labeled "erroneous," of
course, if it is reversed by the Supreme
Court. The decision of the Supreme
Court is "infallible only because [it is]
final."t The mere fact that the Ninth

Ninth Circuit
15.3
16.4
16.3
17.3
18.8
13.8
12.3
12.1
12.0
15.9
15.2
11.1
14.7

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Average

All ci rcuits
12.6
13.4
12.5
13.2
11.8
10.7
10.3
10.9
10.3
11.2
11.9
9.7
11.5

ply present no issue with any discernible
impact upon the overall administration
of justice, involving unique factual configurations which will rarely recur.'"

Win-loss record

Circuit suffered three times as many reversals as any other circuit two years in a
row may simply be attributable to the
number of its cases brought to the Court
by the Solicitor, rather than the overall
quality of its decisions. One qualitative
clue might be the degree of unanimity of
the Supreme Court in Ninth Circuit reversals. If the rate of unanimity is significantly higher than that for other cases
decided by the Court, one might infer
that the "degree" of error in the Ninth
Circuit cases reviewed is greater. Actually, the overall degree of unanimity in
the Supreme Court's decisions reached
the highest peak in many years during
the past two terms-40 per cent of all
published decisions in each term were
unanimous."o The degree of unanimity
in Ninth Circuit reversals was not substantially greater: 39 per cent of the 198384 reversals were unanimous, while 46
per cent of the 1984-85 reversals lacked
dissents."?
Even when the unanimous reversals are
individually analyzed, one is frequently
left with the haunting question of why
such a case ever found its way into the
hallowed chambers of the United States
Supreme Court. Many of these cases sim-

While an "erroneous" lower court decision from the perspective of the Supreme
Court is one which is actually reversed,
from the perspective of the Solicitor
General it may simply be one which the
government has lost in the lower court.
One explanation for the larger proportion of Ninth Circuit cases on the Solicitor's Supreme Court docket may simply
be that the government loses more of its
cases in the Ninth than in other circuits.
While the government's win-loss record cannot be ascertained for appeals in
civil cases, the record for criminal cases
is readily available. With rare exceptions, all appeals from criminal cases are
brought by defendants, so every reversal
is a loss for the government. When the
criminal reversal rate for the Ninth Circuit is compared with other circuits (see
Table 6), this explanation appears plausible. The Ninth Circuit criminal reversal rate was highest of all circuits in
1984, and third highest in 1983. Closer
examination of this reversal rate, however, suggests it has more to do with the
nature of the caseload than the "liberality" of Ninth Circuit judges. When the
criminal reversal rate in the Ninth Circuit is analyzed for the 12 year period
preceding 1983-84 (see Table 7), it can be
seen that the Ninth Circuit has always
maintained a higher reversal rate than
the other circuits, and that the 1983-84
rates are close to the 12-year average of
14.7 per cent for the Ninth Circuit.
There is certainly no basis in this data to
attribute a higher reversal rate to the
influx of Carter appointees, since the
average criminal reversal rate in the

14. United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. - 85 L.Ed.2d 462, 467-68, 105 S.Ct. 2103, 2106 (1985).
15. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953)
(Jackson, J., concurring):
"However, reversal by a higher court is not proof
that justice is thereby better done. There is no doubt
that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts
would also be reversed. We are not final because we
are infallible, but we are infallible only because we
are final."
16. Supreme Court Review, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, September 2, 1985, at p. S-3, indicating a steady
climb in the proportion of unanimous decisions
from a low of 25 per cent in the 1979-80 Term.
17. Compiled from official reports of U.S. Supreme Court opinions, 1983-85. It should be noted

that the 40 per cent overall unanimity rate for the
Supreme Court includes both affirmances and reversals. The unanimity rate forjust reversals may be
lower, so the unanimity rate in Ninth Circuit reversals would reflect greater disparity.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 471 U.S.
85 L.Ed.2d 99,105 S.Ct. 1811 (1985); United States v.
83 L.Ed.2d 450, 105 S.Ct. 465
Abel, 469 U.S. 83
(1984); United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. L.Ed.2d 461, 105 S.Ct. 471 (1984). Compare the
conclusions reached by Estreicher & Sexton, New
York University Supreme Court Project, 59
N.Y.U.L. REV. 481 (1984), described as an "unusually perceptive study of this court's docket" by Jus- 105
tice Stevens. California v. Carney, -U.S. S.Ct. 2066,, 85 L.Ed.2d 406, 418 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).

Compiled from the Annual Reports of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1971-1982, Table
B-1.
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Ninth Circuit was higher before 1977
than after. While the government apparently does lose more appeals in the
Ninth Circuit than in other circuits, this
is not a new phenomenon, but a consistent pattern with a 15-year history.

Influencing en banc hearings

The spectre of
judicial politics
may be lurking
in the background.

Another explanation for the disproportionate attention the Solicitor General is
giving the Ninth Circuit involves a very
practical process of case management. In
addition to controlling all petitions for
certiorariby federal authorities, the Solicitor also determines whether a rehear- ... Both at the certioraristage and also the
ing en banc should be sought in a court merits stage, we have had a higher rate of
of appeals. To the extent that the Solicitor success-by about 20 percentage points in
can convince judges at the court of each instance-with our cases that have
gone through an en banc denial, than is
appeals level that the denial of a rehear- true of our cases in general... The fact that
ing en banc is simply a prelude to I have authorized en banc rehearing indiSupreme Court review, and Supreme cates a fair statistical possibility
that a peti22
Court review means a substantial prob- tion for certiorarimay follow.
ability of Supreme Court reversal, he
Viewed from this perspective, the tarmay be able to increase his rate of success geting of the Ninth Circuit for so many
on petitions for en banc hearings, and reversals may have been a prelude to the
get at least some of the decisions he is subliminal message presented to the
unhappy with reversed without having Ninth Circuit judges: Avoid the embarto bother the Supreme Court.
rassment of so many Supreme Court reThe Solicitor's rate of success in peti- versals by granting more of our en banc
tions for en banc hearings in the courts petitions and cleaning up your own act.
of appeals is substantially lower than his
The message loses much of its force,
success rate in petitions for certiorariin however, when we count up the number
the Supreme Court. Over the course of of Ninth Circuit cases that the Solicitor
the four year period from 1980-84, the 12 took to the Supreme Court during the
courts of appeals denied 81 per cent of past two terms which were precededby a
the en banc petitions authorized by the petition for en banc hearing in the Ninth
Solicitor General. 9 The Solicitor is twice Circuit. Of the 28 certiorari petitions
as likely to petition for certiorari in a filed, only 4 were preceded by an en banc
case where his en banc petition is denied petition. One of the 4 was granted and
than in a case where no such petition heard en banc. Actually, this rate of 14
was filed.20 And the prospects for having per cent is substantially lower than the
such a certioraripetition granted and the other federal circuits. During the same
case reversed is even higher than the two terms, of the 64 petitions for certio2
Solicitor's phenomenal "normal" rate. 1 rarifiled from decisions of circuits other
These convincing figures were the pre- than the Ninth, 33, or 51 per cent, were
lude to an ominous warning which preceded by petitions for en banc hearSolicitor General Rex E. Lee delivered to ings, of which only one was granted!23
the judges of the Ninth Circuit at their Thus, it appears that the Solicitor pur1984 Judicial Conference in Seattle:
sued en banc hearings with less fre19. Remarks of Rex E. Lee, supra n. 10, at 4.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 4-5.
22. Id. at 5.
23. Figures were compiled from the published
decisions of U.S. Courts of Appeals in F.2d.

24. The Ninth Circuit granted 14 en banc hearings in 1983, 12 in 1984, and 9 in the first 10months
of 1985: 37 per cent of hearings granted were on
petition by the Solicitor General. (Figures supplied
to author by Cathy Catterson, Acting Clerk, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, October 18,
1985.)
25. Gottschall, Carter's judicial appointments:

the influence of affirmative action and merit selection on voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67
JUOICATURE 164, 167 (1983).
26. See n. 9, supra.
27. Flaherty, Inside the 'Invisible' Courts, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, May 2, 1983, at p. 28.
28. Granelli, 9th Circuit Rejects Split; Wants
Time to Experiment, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL,
March 28, 1983, at p. 34. The Ninth Circuit utilizes
a limited en banc court consistingof the chiefjudge
and 10 additional judges drawn by lot for en banc
hearings. See Rule 25, Rules of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
29. Id.
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quency and greater success in the Ninth
than in other circuits, at least in cases he
subsequently presented to the Supreme
Court. It would appear, then, that he was
delivering his "message" in the wrong
forum. In any event, the message was
ignored. The number of en banc petitions granted in the Ninth Circuit continued to decline in 1985.24

Machiavellian politics?
The final possible explanation for the
Solicitor General's preoccupation with
the Ninth Circuit is the most Machiavellian. The Ninth Circuit is, without a
doubt, the court most profoundly influenced by the judicial appointments of
President Jimmy Carter: 15 of the 23
judges active on the court during the
period in question were put there by
him.25 The embarrassment of an unusually high reversal rate for this court
could achieve a number of political objectives. It could add credibility to the
claim that President Reagan needed four
more years to correct an "imbalance" in
the federal judiciary. The impact of his
judicial appointments, and the denigration of his predecessor's judicial appointments, played a prominent role in the
political rhetoric of the 1984 presidential
campaign. In the midst of that campaign, in the summer of 1984, newspaper stories were widely circulated
under such headline banners as "Activists on the Ninth Circuit Strike Out.''26
In addition to presidential politics,
the spectre of judicial politics may also
be lurking in the background. Chief Justice Warren Burger has made no secret of
his determination to split up the Ninth
Circuit, publicly labeling it an "unman27
ageable administrative monstrosity"
and criticizing the practice of limiting
en banc hearings to a minority of the
judges on the court.28 The judges of the
Ninth Circuit appear united in their
opposition to bifurcation.2 9 A public
perception that the Ninth Circuit is
seriously "out of step" with other federal
courts can only help the Chief Justice's
campaign to dismantle it.
An analysis of the Ninth Circuit decisions reversed by the Supreme Court
supports the premise that ideological differences certainly play an important part
in the confrontation. The judges appointed by President Carter are clearly
responsible for the vast majority of the

Table 8 Ninth Circuit judges concurring In
decisions reversed by U.S. Supreme
Court, 1983-84 and 1984-85 Terms

Table 9 Votes of Supreme Court Justices In

Number of cases

No of cases
in dissent

Carter appointees
Alarcon
Boochever
Canby
Faris
Ferguson
Fletcher
Hug
Nelson
Norris
Poole
Pregerson
Reinhardt
Schroeder
Skopil
'rang
Average for Carter appointees:

.. I

I

*Iu. Wf I

1984-8 5 Terms

3
5
10
2
13
8
4
5
6
4
8
10
4
5
II
6.5

Non-Carter appointees
Anderson
Browning
Choy
Duniway
Goodwin
Kennedy
Kilkenny
Sneed
Wallace
Wright
Average for non-Carter appointees:
Compiled from published decisions of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in F.2d.

decisions being reversed (see Table 8).
This shouldn't surprise anyone, however. The Supreme Court Justices appointed by presidents Nixon and Reagan are just as clearly responsible for

Justice

C]O
a.

a.l

Conclusion

49

2

46
31

2
20

The remarkable reversal record compiled
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in the U.S. Supreme Court
in the past two terms can be seen, at least
in part, as the handiwork of the Solicitor

30

21

48

3

General. It cannot be wholly explained

41
47
36
48

3
4
15
3

No. of cases
in majority

Burger, C.J.
Blackmun
Brennan
Marshall
O'Connor
Powell
Rehnquist
Stevens
White

uu-'oq

by thecourt's higher propensity forerror

or stubborn refusal to reconsider its decisions en banc. Rather than reflecting a
court which is ideologically "out of

Compiled from offic ial reports of U.S. Supreme Court
opinions.

more of the rev 'ersals (see Table 9). Ideological differer ices are a factor, but that
does not dispe l the inference that the
numbers may be manipulated and the
drama of the confrontation contrived.
The same ideo logical differences dominate the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, with
President Cartter filling two-thirds of
their active j ud geships.30 Eighty per cent.
of the cases tIhe Solicitor took to the
Supreme Cour t from those two circuits
in the past two terms were reversed (see
Table 5). But it he grand total of cert petitions filed by thhe Solicitor from both the
Fifth and Sixtlh Circuits for both terms
was 14, compaared to 28 for the Ninth
Circuit alone (:see Table 3).

step," it may simply reflect a Justice
Department which is carefully selecting
its target. The perception of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals as a "liberal"
court packed with Carter appointees is
certainly a perception shared by the Justice Department. To the extent that that
perception affects the selection of cases
for Supreme Court review, it necessarily
affects the validity of Professor Spaeth's
conclusion that the Supreme Court does
not differ in the treatment of federal circuit court decisions depending on which
circuit they emanate from.
0
30. Gottschall, supra n. 25, at 167.
GERALD F UELMEN is a professor of law at
Loyola Law School (Los Angeles).

A reply and rejoinder
Reply
by Harold J. Spaeth
I hold no brief in support of or in opposition to Professor Uelmen's thesis concerning the reversal rate of the Ninth
Circuit. I do submit, however, that he
has not proven his case.
He asserts that two of the findings I
reported, "Supreme Court disposition of
federal circuit court decisions," 68 Judicature 245 (1985), are "premature." He
bases his judgment on an analysis of but
two terms of the Burger Court's decisions, notwithstanding my additional
finding-encompassing 14 terms-that
marked variations occurred in the manner in which the Supreme Court disposed of cases from specific circuits over
the course of two or three terms. Id. at
250. Thus, any given circuit could expect
a period or two during which its decisions would be upheld or reversed at a
rate markedly variant from that attained
over the entire 14 years.
Apart from the fact that Solicitor Gen-

eral Lee has himself labeled Uelmen's
conclusions "dead wrong" in an article
which appeared in the Los Angeles Daily
Journal,December 18, 1985, at page 17,
Uelmen's imputation of causality to an
association between Lee and the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the
Ninth Circuit is no more scholarly or
scientific than attaching causality to a
post hoc, propterhoc relationship. 0
HAROLD J. SPAETH is a professor of politicalscience at Michigan State University and a
member of the Michigan Bar.

Rejoinder
By Gerald F. Uelmen
The full statement by former Solicitor
General Rex Lee, who was sent an
advance copy of this article, as quoted in
the Los Angeles Daily Journal,December 18, 1985, is as follows:
Lee, reached at his Washington, D.C., law
firm, said he respected Uelmen's scholarship but called his conclusions "almost
flattering and dead wrong." He said he
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"subconsciously" may have been more
skeptical of Ninth Circuit decisions than
those from other circuits but only because
the Ninth Circuit's opinions had displayed
"a judicial philosophy that is not favorable to the government." Lee said he and
"many of the people in my office" developed an impression that "there were panels of the Ninth Circuit that were more
likely to commit error or were more likely
to make rulings that were opposed by the
government than would the average Court
of Appeals panel throughout the country."
Said Lee, "That is quite different from setting out in advance to target a particular
circuit for more intensive scrutiny."
Several inferences might be drawn
from this statement, just as several inferences might be drawn from the data I've
compiled. While the suggestion that
considerations of judicial politics might
affect the selection of circuit court decisions for the Supreme Court docket may
be difficult to stuff into a computer, the
possibility should not be dismissed out
of hand. Political naivete is hardly a prerequisite to drawing scholarly or scientific conclusions.

